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Abstract
This paper analyses the effect of changes in house prices on household saving. The life-cycle
model predicts that homeowners compensate an unexpected decrease in home equity by increas-
ing their saving, and that the effect becomes stronger as the age of the household increases. To
test these hypotheses I use panel data from the Dutch Central Bank Household Survey (DHS)
for the 2003-2013 period, which includes the boom and bust cycle of the Dutch housing bubble.
I employ self-reported measures of the change in house prices, as well as a new measure of saving
which allows to accurately separate active (dis)saving from capital gains and losses. In addition,
I employ subjective house price expectations to compute measures of the unexpected change
in house prices. The panel regression results show no significant effect of any of the measures
of the change in house prices on saving, which suggests that households do not internalize the
investment dimension of housing.
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1 Introduction
During the 1990s and early 2000s the Dutch housing market experienced continued increases in
prices which came to an abrupt end in 2008, followed by a drop of around 20% between 2008
and 2013. Figure 1 shows a clear turning point in 2008, which coincided with a downturn in
economic growth indicating the start of the recent economic crisis. A crucial factor determin-
ing the pre-2008 house price increase was the rise in housing demand, which was fuelled by
pro-homeownership government measures implemented during the 1990s. The latter included
generous tax deductions of mortgage interest payments and the introduction of a so-called na-
tional mortgage guarantee (NMG).1 These measures, coupled with the relaxation of mortgage
borrowing conditions, prompted a surge in homeownership and contributed to the development
of a notable housing bubble, which busted in 2008.
Figure 1 Evolution of House Prices and Economic Growth
Source: CBS; Notes: Average nominal house prices are given relative to 2010. The
real rate of GDP growth, is given in terms of 2005 prices. The left axis measures
house prices while the right axis measures economic growth.
In this paper I use the changes in house prices prompted by the 2008 turning point to study
the consequences at the household level. When a household decides to purchase a house, it usu-
ally implies investing a big share of its wealth on a single and rather illiquid asset. Therefore,
from the household perspective, housing is both a consumption good and an investment good.
The aim of this paper is to investigate to what extent the investment dimension of housing is
taken into account. To this end, I employ a life-cycle perspective and study how the saving
behaviour of homeowners has reacted to the changes in house prices observed in Figure 1. Ac-
cording to the life-cycle model, if housing is regarded as a long-term investment, homeowners
1The NMG provides an insurance that applies if a homeowner, under certain unfavourable circumstance (e.g.
unemployment, divorce or work incapacity) must sell his/her house and the proceedings do not cover the full
remaining mortgage debt.
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will offset house price increases (decreases) by decreasing (increasing) their saving. Therefore,
if a negative relationship is observed, one may presume that housing is considered as a saving
instrument, and thus that households take into account the investment dimension of housing.
This is a very relevant question given the present context of increasing fragility of pension sys-
tems in Europe. Answering it, provides insights on whether housing wealth should be considered
as savings when evaluating how households financially prepare for retirement.
In an early empirical study based on US data, Engelhardt (1996) finds that housing wealth
changes negatively affect the saving of homeowners. This result suggests that housing is to some
extent substitutable with other (more liquid) types of assets. Rouwendal and Alessie (2002)
confirm this result using data from the Dutch socio-economic panel. More recently, van Beers
et al. (2015) have revived the topic by employing Dutch administrative panel data. They find
a negative effect of house prices on household saving, which appears to be strongest for young
highly leveraged households. Several studies have looked at the other side of the coin, namely
at the effect of house price changes on household consumption. Campbell and Cocco (2007) find
a large positive effect on consumption for old homewoners and an effect that is close to zero for
the younger ones. On the contrary, Attanasio et al. (2009) find that the relationship is stronger
for younger than for old homeowners, while Disney et al. (2010) find no age heterogeneity.
More recently, Browning et al. (2013), find no evidence of an effect of house price changes on
consumption. Due to the variety in the results, it is difficult to establish a general relation at
the micro level.2 Therefore, every country and period deserves its own detailed analysis.
To conduct the present study, I start by exploring the topic at hand at the theoretical level.
Following Artle and Varaiya (1978) and Li and Yao (2007), I include the housing asset into the
life-cycle model. For the sake of simplicity, I do not consider neither lifetime uncertainty nor
income uncertainty and I leave out the possibility of a bequest motive. The only source of uncer-
tainty is thus the yearly rate of change in house prices. I do not endogenize the tenure decision
(owning vs renting), and hence I study the case of a homeowner and of a renter separately.3
The main prediction of the model is that households will react to an unexpected loss in housing
wealth by saving more and thus increasing their stock of financial wealth. The intuition is that
households increase saving to smooth the drop in consumption implied by the shock to lifetime
income. In addition, the model predicts that the effect increases with age since older households
have a shorter lifetime horizon and thus less time to smooth the shock.
To test the model implications I employ panel data mainly from the Dutch National Bank
Household Survey (DHS) for the period 2003-2013 and I use a range of different measures of
saving and house price changes. DHS provides a novel measure of saving by asking respondents
how much money they have put aside in a given year. In previous literature (i.e. Engelhardt,
1996; Rouwendal and Alessie, 2002; and van Beers et al. 2015) saving is measured as the yearly
change in wealth, which makes it difficult to disentangle active (dis)saving from capital gains (or
2Studies using aggregate data, e.g. Peek (1983), Bhatia (1987), Skinner (1989), Case et al. (2005) and Carroll
et al. (2011), have consistently shown evidence of a positive link between house prices and consumption at the
macro level. However, it seems difficult to account for all variables affecting aggregate consumption and house
prices at the same time. Therefore, it is questionable to take a stand on a causal relationship between these two
variables at the aggregate level (Attanasio et al. 2011).
3Note that these are the standard, and often implicit, assumptions in the micro literature on the effect of house
price changes on saving and consumption. For the sake of transparency, I make them explicit in this paper so
their relevance can be easily evaluated by the reader.
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losses) and portfolio reshuﬄing. By measuring saving as self-reported money put aside by house-
holds in a given year, these problems are overcome. For the sake of robustness and comparison
with previous literature, I employ a second measure of saving consisting of the yearly change
in long-term assets.4 Furthermore, since negative (positive) changes in mortgage debt can be
considered as saving (dissaving), I employ a third measure of saving that consists of subtracting
the yearly change in remaining mortgage debt from the the yearly change in long-term assets.
Regarding house price changes, DHS provides self-reported house prices and self-reported bi-
ennial changes in house prices. In addition, it provides subjective expectations on the evolution
of house prices both at the level of the own house and at the market level. I use these subjec-
tive expectations to compute measures of the unexpected change in house prices. To do so, I
subtract the expected change for a particular year from the self-reported change for that same
year and, as a result, only the unexpected part of the change is left. This procedure is arguably
more reliable than those employed in previous literature (e.g. Disney et al. 2010; Browning et
al. 2013; and van Beers et al. 2015) based on the estimation of models of the aggregate house
price process as a method to generate house price expectations, which are assumed to be homo-
geneous for all households. I addition to the house price change measures from DHS, I employ
as well house price data from Statistic Netherlands (CBS) at the provincial level and data from
the National Association of Real State Agents (NVM). The latter divide the Netherlands in 76
regions and provide yearly average house price values for each region.
By controlling for a series of demographic and economic variables, as well as for both unob-
served household effects and aggregate time effects, the panel regression results show no signif-
icant effect of any of the measures of the change in house prices on saving. In most cases, the
magnitude of the coefficient estimates I find, as well as the confidence intervals, are rather close
to zero. The analysis does not yield significant results even when I condition the effect on age,
on having negative home equity, on the sign of the house price change and on having an NMG.
The results are in essence unchanged by a long series of robustness checks. Among others, the
latter comprise the consideration of a lag between the change in house prices and the reaction in
saving and a correction for possible measurement error caused by rounding error in self-reported
house price changes. The latter check is conducted by using the CBS and NVM measures of
the change in house prices (unaffected by rounding error) as an instrument for self-reported
measures. These results suggest that households do not consciously use the housing asset as a
saving instrument. Even though the purchase of a house usually implies per se investing a large
share of household wealth into a single asset, the results imply that households regard housing
more as a consumption good than as an investment good. In addition, they imply that Dutch
households have taken a considerable loss in their wealth, since they have not compensated the
recent drop in house prices with an increase in any other type of long-term assets. This has
important implications in the present context of increasing fragility of the pension system.
The rest of the document is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model;
Section 3 provides data description and preliminary evidence; Section 4 explains the method-
ology; Section 5 presents the empirical results; Section 6 concludes. The appendices provide
additional data description, summary statistics and an extended version of the theoretical model.
4By long-term assets I refer to assets that are meant as saving instruments for the long-term, like for instance
private pension plans.
4
2 Life-Cycle Model With Housing
In this section I introduce a formal description of life-cycle saving and consumption in the
presence of housing.5 According to Engelhardt (1996), in the case of a homeowner, the effect of
house price changes on saving crucially relies on four assumptions. First, the change must be
unanticipated and perceived as permanent. Second, housing wealth must be substitutable with
other more liquid forms of wealth. Third, households must be able to somehow liquidate housing
wealth so it can actually be substituted by other forms of wealth. Fourth, the household must
not regard the house as an asset to be bequeathed. Note that these assumptions are usually
implicit in the literature. For the sake of transparency, I make them explicit here so their role
can be easily assessed. Bearing the assumptions in mind, consider a household that lives for
four periods and maximizes the following utility function













where Cτt is consumption in period t as planned in period τ , H is constant housing, ρ is the rate
of time preference, γ is the rate of relative risk aversion, θ is the preference for housing and λ is
the utility gain from owning the occupied house.6
I assume the house is purchased by taking out a mortgage. In the Netherlands households
can borrow close to 100% of the value of a house and hence there is no downpayment restriction.
However, previous income is required, hence, the purchase of the house takes place at the
beginning of the second period. Since there is no bequest motive, the house is sold at the
beginning of the last period and the proceeds are used for consumption. Therefore, the household
is a renter in the first and fourth periods. Bearing this in mind, the intertemporal budget
















where Θ and Ω are lifetime consumption and lifetime labour income respectively, αt is the
unitary real price of housing, φ is the transaction cost incurred to sell the house, Kt is the cost
of renting, M is the mortgage loan, rM is the interest rate on the mortgage and r is the interest
rate determining the return on savings.7 The second term on the left hand side of (2) denotes
the amount the household expects to receive when the house is sold, while the last term on
the right had side accounts for the expected lifetime housing expenditures. The expectation
operators are due to uncertainty regarding the rate of change in house prices, which, in turn,
implies uncertainty in future house prices, mortgage payments and rental prices.8 The rate of
change in house prices is defined as µt = (αt − αt−1)/αt−1, and I assume the household expects
5I borrow modelling aspects from Artle and Varaiya (1978), Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), Li and Yao
(2007) and Campbell and Cocco (2007). For a more detailed description of the model which also considers the
case of a renter, see Appendix E. Here I present only the case of a homeowner.
6λ = 0 for a renter and λ ≥ 0 for an owner.
7I assume the rental price to be a function of the house price given by Kt = κ+δαtH, where κ is a constant and
δ is the sensitivity to the house price. The household borrows 100% of the value of the house, hence M = α2H.
8Note that I employ point expectations, implying that the expected future value of house prices affects the
decision of the household while the variance (i.e. house price risk) does not.
5
it to be positive and constant, i.e. E(µt) = µ > 0.
At the beginning of period one the household sets an optimal plan by maximizing (1) subject





where Λt is the factor containing ρ and r that distributes lifetime income among the four periods
of life and Ξ is what I call the owning factor. The latter equals the value of the house at the
selling period minus all the lifetime housing related expenses. Any change in the owning factor
that is known in the planning period will be incorporated in the maximization problem and
distributed among the four periods according to the Λt factors. If the expectation regarding µt
is fulfilled in all periods, the house will be sold at the expected price an actual consumption in
each period will equal the plan set in period one.
I consider now the event of a one period negative surprise in the value of µt that can take
place in periods either two, three or four. I assume the information about the realized value of µt
becomes available at the beginning of each period. In addition, I assume the negative surprise
takes place only in a particular period, while in the rest of periods the initial expectation is
fulfilled. Realized consumption in a period with a negative surprise is given by
Ct = C
1
t + ηt, (4)
where ηt is the forecast error equal to the difference between actual consumption, Ct, and the
consumption plan set in period one, C1t . The forecast error occurs as a direct consequence of the
lower-than-expected µt, which implies that the expected value of ηt is zero. Realized consump-
tion is the result of the reoptimization the household undertakes when the new information is
available. As can be seen in (4), a negative forecast error implies a reduction in consumption.
The household realizes the house will be sold in the last period for a lower price compared to
what was originally planned and adjusts consumption accordingly. For a given size of the shock,
the contemporaneous effect on consumption will be higher the closer the household is to selling
the house. If the surprise takes place in period two, there are still two more periods to smooth
the shock, whereas if it happens in period four the whole shock to lifetime income has to be
absorbed in just one period. Therefore, the contemporaneous effect on consumption will be
stronger the older the household is.
The result for consumption in (4) can be easily given in terms of savings. The contempora-
neous effect on the stock of savings of a change in house prices in periods two and three is given
by
S2 = S1(1 + r) + Y2 − C12 −MrM − η2 (5)
and
S3 = S2(1 + r) + Y3 − C13 −M(1 + rM )− η3 (6)
respectively, where St is the stock of savings (financial wealth) at the end of period t. The
negative sign in front of the forecast error implies that a negative surprise in house prices has
a positive effect on savings. The intuition is that households increase savings to smooth over
6
Figure 2 Evolution of Homeownership in Old Age
Source: DHS; Notes: Data between 2008 and 2013 are employed. Each one of the
lines depicts a particular cohort. There are four five-year cohorts with ages 59-63, 64-
68, 69-73 and 74-78 in 2009. The vertical axis measures cohort specific homeownership
rate, while the horizontal axis measures age.
time the drop in consumption implied by the shock to lifetime income. The later in life, the
less periods there are to smooth consumption so the higher has to be the compensatory increase
in savings. Therefore, the contemporaneous effect on savings of a negative housing surprise is
higher (in absolute value) the older the household is.
3 Data and Preliminary Evidence
To estimate the relations that derive from (5) and (6) I use data mainly from the Dutch National
Bank Household Survey (DHS), which is an internet based panel survey that collects data on
economic, financial and psychological aspects of both individual and household behaviour. It
provides data for around two thousand Dutch households every year between 1993 and 2013.
Households without a computer and/or access to internet are provided with a basic computer
and internet connection to complete the survey. Attrition is dealt with by biannually refreshing
the sample with new households to keep the panel representative of the Dutch population. Com-
pensatory household weights are used to correct for unequal selection probabilities. To construct
my sample I take only the responses from household heads and I exclude those households that
have moved during the period of interest. The main advantage of this survey is that it provides
measures of saving, assets, liabilities, house prices and house price expectations that are useful
for the present study.9 Since data on expectations are only available from 2003 onwards, I only
use data for the years running from 2003 until 2013, both included, which is long enough to
capture the boom and bust cycle in the Dutch housing market.
Following the model in Section 2, for the econometric analysis I split the sample between
homewoners and renters. Figure 2 shows the cohort-specific relation between homeownership
and age as found in the sample for households above 60 years of age. Even though there are
obvious cohort effects, homwownership does not appear to decline clearly over time within co-
9For short variable definitions, sources and summary statistics, see tables A1 to A4 in Appendix A.
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horts. This fact coincides with the evidence in Van der Schors et al. (2007) and in Van Ooijen
et al. (2015), who also find steady homeownership rates among Dutch retirees despite strong
cohort effects. In light of the evidence, the model assumption stating that homeowners sell their
house towards the end of their life seems far fetched. However, the idea behind this assumption
is not generating a realistic prediction, but more that of capturing the financial security that
households obtain by possessing an asset that can eventually be sold later in life. Furthermore,
it is possible that the elderly use other means to liquidate part of their housing like for instance
by means of own-to-own transitions or by taking an extra mortgage.
3.1 Saving Measures
The main measure of saving I employ is obtained by asking DHS respondents how much money
they have put aside in a given year. First, the questionnaire asks if any money was put aside.
Those who respond affirmatively are then provided with seven intervals that range from “Less
than 1500 Euros” to “More than 75000”. This measure of saving is much less noisy and more
accurate than other measures employed in the previous literature.10 Nevertheless, it has the
disadvantage of being provided in intervals and of not capturing dissaving. Figure 3 shows the
yearly average responses, which I compute by taking the midpoint of each interval and by assign-
ing the value 75000 to the highest interval. The solid columns shows a clear increase in average
saving between 2005 and 2009. After 2009, there are yearly fluctuations but average values
stay at a higher level compared to earlier years in the sample. The percentage of respondents
reporting no money put aside stays rather constant over time at a value between 30% and 35%.
These responses, to which I assign for now a value of zero, are excluded from the computation
of the averages in Figure 3.
In addition to money put aside, and for the sake of comparison with the previous litera-
ture, I employ as well the yearly change in long-term assets (LTA) as a measure of saving. I
define the latter as the sum of saving accounts, private pensions and employer sponsored saving
plans.11 The solid line in Figure 4 gives the evolution of the average yearly change in LTA, which
appears to be more volatile than the measure depicted in Figure 3. Following Rouwendal and
Alessie (2002) and van Beers et al. (2015), negative (positive) changes in remaining mortgage
debt (RMD) can be considered as saving (dissaving). Therefore, I employ a third measure of
saving which consists of subtracting the yearly change in RMD from the yearly change in LTA.
Differently from van Beers et al. (2015), for households with a life-insurance mortgage, the
DHS dataset allows considering the cash value of the life insurance as and additional part of the
mortgage loan.12 The time evolution of the latter measure’s average is depicted by the dashed
line in Figure 4, which shows even more volatility than the solid line. Note that when using this
measures it is not possible to separate active saving from capital gains (or losses) and portfolio
reshuﬄing. However, they have the advantage of capturing dissaving.
10Engelhardt (1996), Rouwendal and Alessie (2002) and van Beers (2015) employ changes in wealth components
as a measure of saving. This measure is very noisy and it is very easily contaminated since it is difficult to
disentangle active saving from capital gains and losses, as well as from portfolio reshuﬄing.
11Saving accounts include saving or deposit accounts, deposit books and savings certificates. For a thorough
definition and classification of household financial assets in the Netherlands, see Alessie et al. (2002).
12Life-insurance mortgages are a popular type of mortgage in the Netherlands which couple the mortgage loan
with the purchase of a life insurance.
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Figure 3 Average Saving (Money Put Aside)
Source: DHS; Notes: The survey question asks how much money the household has
put aside in a given year. Respondents are provided with a series of intervals. Yearly
averages are computed taking the midpoint of each interval. The stripped columns
picture the percentage of households who report no money put aside, to whom a zero
value is assigned. The zeros are not included in the average. The left axis measures
saving, while the right axis measures the percentage of zeros.
Figure 4 Average Saving (Change in Long-Term Assets)
Source: DHS; Notes: LTA stands for Long-Term Assets, while RMD stands for
Remaining Mortgage Debt. Long-term assets are the sum of saving accounts, private
pensions and employer sponsored saving plans.
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3.2 House Price Change Measures
To capture the change in house prices I use different measures, as well as different sources. DHS
provides self-reported house prices and self-reported biennial changes in house prices. The for-
mer are obtained by asking homeowners how much money they think they would get by selling
their house, while the latter are obtained by asking about the percentage change in the house
price for the two last years. I compute then two measures: the first, Self-reported 1, by taking
the yearly percentage change in the self-reported house price; and the second, Self-reported 2,
by transforming the two-year self-reported change into a yearly change. To obtain the latter, I
assume that the percentage change in the last two years can be decomposed into two identical
annual changes.13 Ideally, the two measures should provide the same value. Figure 5 shows how
on average they are very close (see dashed lines). In addition, both show a similar tendency over
time compared to the national average provided by Statistic Netherlands (CBS) and depicted
by the solid black line in Figure 5. The only remarkable difference is that the self-reported
measures show a less pronounced decline between 2008 and 2013, which might have to do with
the fact that homeowners are reluctant to acknowledge a decline in the price of their house.14
I complement the DHS self-reported measures with measures provided by CBS and by the
National Association of Real State Agents (NVM). CBS provides average house price percentage
changes at the province level (there are 12 provinces in the Netherlands), while NVM divides
the Netherlands in 76 different regions and provides average percentage changes for each one
of them. Both measures are based on all transactions taking place in the second hand housing
market. With the aid of postal code information corresponding to all DHS respondents, I am
able to place each household in a particular NVM region. In that way, I match DHS household
data with NVM house price data. Figure 5 reports the national average of the CBS measure.
In addition to house price measures, DHS provides information on house price expectations.
Homeowners are asked every year how much they expect the price of their house, as well as the
average price in the market, is going to increase, in percentage, during the following year. Given
this information, I compute measures of the unexpected change in house prices in the following
way: for every year I subtract from the actual change in house prices (i.e. the self-reported
measures, as well as the CBS and NVM measures) the change that was expected for that par-
ticular year. After the subtraction, only the unexpected part of the change is left. When the
actual change is above the expected change, the household experiences a positive surprise, while
a negative surprise occurs when the opposite takes place. Figures 5 and 6 show that, previous
to the year 2008, homeowners in the sample experienced on average positive surprises since they
expected lower changes in house prices compared to what actually happened. However, this
situation reverses after the year 2010.
The availability of subjective expectations arguably provides a considerable advantage with










which transforms the biennial change into an annual change assuming the change is identical for the two years.
14van der Cruijsen et al. (2014) employ DHS data and find that homeowners hold an over-optimistic view of
the price of their house.
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Figure 5 Expected vs Actual Average House Price Changes
Source: DHS and CBS; Notes: Self-reported 1 is the average change in the self-
reported price of the own house. Self-reported 2 is the average self-reported change
in the price of the own house. The expected change in house prices is measured at
time t-1.
Figure 6 Average Unexpected Change in House Prices
Source: DHS; Notes: The unexpected change is computed here as the difference be-
tween Self-reported 2 for a particular year and the one-year expectation regarding the
price of the own house for that same year. The average is taken once the subtraction
is performed for each household in the sample.
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respect to previous literature. For instance, Disney et al. (2010), Browning et al. (2013),
and van Beers et al. (2015) rely on estimating models of the house price process to forecast
future house price changes. They subtract the forecasted changes from the realized data and,
thereby, come up with a proxy for unexpected changes. In contrariety to this approach, Niu
and van Soest (2014) find that house price expectations depend on subjective perception and
individual characteristics, thus they are highly heterogeneous. Their results are in line with
previous literature (e.g. Case et al. 2012; and Beshears et al. 2013) and suggest that subjective
data are a more reliable input when computing unexpected changes in house prices.
A comparison of Figures 3 and 4 with Figures 5 and 6 suggests a correlation between house
price changes and household saving. Figure 3 suggests a negative correlation while Figure 4
suggests a positive correlation. Even though it is tempting to draw conclusions based on these
figures, the evidence is very preliminary and it is only based on correlations between sample
averages. It is likely that saving is conditioned by the business cycle, while the latter probably
as well be related to the evolution of house prices. Therefore, it is necessary to disentangle the
effect of house price changes from the effect of general macroeconomic conditions. In addition,
there are several household level variables (income, risk aversion, family structure, etc.) that
may influence saving as well as self-reported house price changes. Therefore, they have to be
included in the microeconometric analysis.
4 Methodology
4.1 Specification
To estimate the effect of house price changes on saving I follow a reduced form method. From
the theoretical model I derive an expression for savings, i.e. equations (5) and (6), which I use
as a reference to set up a regression equation. I focus on Equation (6) since, besides mortgage
interest payments, it includes the repayment of the principal and thus is more comprehensive.
Moving lagged savings to the left of the equality and plugging in planned consumption, given
by Equation (3), allows to rewrite (6) as
∆S3 = S2r + Y3 − Ω + E1Ξ
Λ3
−M(1 + rM )− η3, (7)
where ∆S3 = S3−S2 is a flow variable indicating saving, i.e. the change in the stock of savings
from one period to another. An unanticipated shift in the rate of change in house prices, µt,
derives in a forecast error in the consumption level, ηt, which, as Equation (7) shows, has a
negative effect on saving. To estimate this effect of an unanticipated change in house prices on
saving, I set up the following linear regression equation
∆Sit = β0 + β1HPCit + β2(HPCitX1it) + ψX1it + X
′
2itζ +Dt + ci + εit, (8)
where i and t are household and year indices respectively, the βs are unknown coefficients, ∆Sit
denotes saving, HPCit is the (unexpected) house price change given in percentages, X1it is
an interaction variable (i.e. either age, presence of a national mortgage guarantee, a dummy
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indicating negative house price changes or a dummy indicating negative housing equity), X2it
is a vector containing economic, demographic and psychological characteristics of the household
(i.e. value of the house, household income, household wealth, education, mortgage expenditures,
loan to value ratio, household structure and risk aversion) and ψ and ζ are a coefficient and
a vector of coefficients corresponding to the interaction and the control variables respectively.
In addition, Dt is a time effect which I capture by introducing year dummies, and ci + εit is
the composite error term, where ci captures unobserved time-invariant household-specific effects
and εit captures unobserved effects that vary across households and over time. I assume εit is
independent over i and is normally distributed with mean zero.
Even though (8) does not have exactly the same form as (7), it provides an empirical strategy
to estimate the relation between house price changes and saving that derives from (7). In the
special case in which there are no interaction effects, i.e. by imposing the restriction β2 = 0 in
Equation (8), I am then interested in estimating β1, which according to the model it is expected




= β1 + β2X1it, (9)
which shows that it depends both on β1 and β2. Since all of the interaction variables that
I introduce are coded as dummy variables, β1 gives the marginal effect when the interaction
dummy is zero, while the coefficient β2 gives the additional effect for the subgroup indicated by
the dummy X1it. In this case the coefficients in (9) cannot be evaluated in isolation and hence
I compute their joint significance. This issue becomes more clear when I present the results in
Section 5.
4.2 Estimation
As explained in Section 3, the main measure of saving employed in this study is drawn from
the DHS question on the yearly amount of money put aside by households. Respondents are
given seven intervals that range from “Less than 1500 Euros” to “More than 75000”, and they
can also report that no money was put aside. A possibility to deal with such a variable consists
of taking the midpoint of each interval and applying linear estimation methods. This option
implies assigning a value of zero to the observations with no money put aside and a value of
75000 to the observations in the top interval. The problem is that those who are coded with a
zero may have actually dissaved and those coded with 75000 may have actually saved more.
As an alternative to the linear approach, I apply interval regression estimation. As explained
by Wooldridge (2010), this technique is the same as ordered probit but with known thresholds for
the intervals. It consists of defining a new variable int ∆Sit that takes values ranging from one
to seven corresponding to each one of the intervals, and that takes value zero if the respondent
reports no money put aside, in which case saving is zero or negative. Relying on the normality
of εit, the next step consists of defining a likelihood function that depends on the coefficients
in (8) and that gives the probability that int ∆Sit takes any of the possible values from zero
to seven.15 Once the function is defined, maximum likelihood can be applied to estimate the
15In Appendix B, I provide the details explaining the derivation of the likelihood function. For additional
information on interval estimation, see Wooldridge (2010).
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coefficients. In contrast to binary probit, the resulting estimates are directly interpretable as if
a continuous dependent variable had been observed.
An additional issue with methodological consequences is the high chance of a non-zero cor-
relation between the unobserved household effect ci and the explanatory variables, which would
render the estimates inconsistent due to omitted variable bias.16 Therefore, it is appropriate to
consider a technique that tackles this issue. The usual candidate is the fixed effects estimator.
However, it cannot be combined with maximum likelihood estimation due to so-called inciden-
tal parameter problem (Wooldridge, 2010). For this reason I employ a method proposed by
Mundlak (1978), which assumes that ci has the structure
ci = X¯
′
iγ + ui, (10)
where X¯i is a vector containing the household-specific time averages of the regressors in Equation
(8), γ is the corresponding vector of coefficients and ui is a household-specific error component
which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors in (8). By plugging (10) into (8), the
latter assumption allows to solve the inconsistency problem caused by the presence of ci. Once
the substitution is performed, the error term becomes ui+εit and I assume it to be uncorrelated
with the regressors. However, due to the presence of ui, the composite error will display within
household serial correlation. Therefore, I combine the Mundlak method with cluster-robust
estimation of the standard errors, which allows for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(of unknown form) within households.
Due to the inclusion of the household-specific time averages of the explanatory variables in
Equation (8), the estimation of the unknown coefficients will be only based on the variation
that takes place within households. In fact, it can be proved that the Mundlak estimator is
equivalent to the fixed effects estimator (a.k.a. the within estimator). However, the Mundlak
estimator has the advantage that one can decide whether or not to include the time average of
a certain variable in the vector X¯i. For instance, I do not include in X¯i the time averages of
the CBS and NVM variables since they are not likely to be correlated with ci. For the same
reason I do not include the average of the unexpected change in house prices. That is because
when subtracting the expected change from the self-reported change, the effect of the household
specific component cancels out since it is present in both variables. In addition, I do not include
the average of the education variable since the variation that takes place within households is
very low and mostly only due to measurement error.
Interval estimation can be applied in a panel data context, and it allows for the application
of the above described Mundlak method. Therefore, the method I employ can be labelled as
interval regression with Mundlak terms, where the latter refer to the household-specific time
averages of the explanatory variables. When using the two secondary measures of saving as
dependent variable, i.e. the change in long-term assets and the change in long-term assets
minus the change in remaining mortgage debt, I simply apply linear regression with Mundlak
terms since in that case there is no interval structure involved.




This section presents the empirical results. First, I present the results obtained when using
money put aside. After, I present the results obtained when using the change in long-term
assets (LTA) and the change in LTA minus the change in remaining mortgage debt (RMD). In
all regressions, the Mundlak terms are jointly significant at the 1% level, which implies a non-
zero correlation between the household effect, ci, and the regressors. Therefore, excluding the
Mundlak terms would generate a problem of inconsistency. For each results table the estimation
samples are set equal in number of observations to make the results comparable. In addition,
for all measures of the change in house prices, as well as for both saving measures depicted in
Figure 4, I drop both the top and bottom 1% observations to avoid the effect of extreme outliers.
5.1 Money Put Aside
Table 1 shows the results obtained for homeowners when employing different measures of the
change in house prices without including any interaction variable. I employ the measures de-
scribed in Section 3 and, in addition, I use the one-year expected percentage change in the price
of the own house (Expected 1) and the one-year expected percentage change in the average mar-
ket price (Expected 2). The coefficient β1 can be interpreted as the change in saving (given in
Euros) as a consequence of a one percentage point increase in house prices. All of the estimates
of β1 shown in Table 1 are not significantly different from zero. The point estimates range from
-6.5 to 76.6. Both are, in absolute terms, less than 0.02% of the average money put aside in the
sample. In fact, the bounds of the 95% confidence intervals are in all cases rather close to zero,
which rules out the possibility of having an economically sizeable effect.17
In addition to the estimates of β1, Table 1 shows a clear positive effect of income, implying
a marginal propensity to save of about 8.7% out of an additional unit of income. I find as
well a clear negative effect of the loan to value ratio, mortgage expenditures and house value.18
Additionally, I find a positive effect, but less significant, of wealth and of higher education. On
the other hand, I do not find a clear effect of variables such as age, number of children, risk
aversion and presence of a partner. However, note that, due to the presence of the Mundlak
terms, the estimates are based only on the variation that takes place within households.
Table 2 shows the results I obtain when using different measures of the unexpected change
in house prices. Note that the model in Section 2 predicts that there will only be a contem-
poraneous effect if the change in house prices is not expected. To capture this phenomenon, I
subtract the one-year expectation about the change in the price of the own house from the two
self-reported measures of the house price change. In that way I obtain the variables Surprise
1 and Surprise 2. In addition, I subtract the same variable from the CBS and NVM variables
to obtain Surprise 3 and 4, and I subtract the one-year expectation about the change in the
17Appendix C shows the point estimates in Tables 1 and 2 bonded by the 95% confidence intervals. Figure C1
shows how the values within the confidence intervals are all rather close to zero, except for the case in which the
CBS data in house prices is used. In the latter case the estimate is less precise since the variation takes place
only at the provincial level.
18Note that the coefficient on the house value variable is not the main coefficient of interest since it captures
the effect a change in a stock (the value of the main residence) on a flow (saving), while β1 captures the effect of
a flow (house price changes) on a flow (saving).
15
Table 1 Money Put Aside: Interval Regression with Mundlak Terms (Homeowners)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income 87.772*** 87.543*** 87.539*** 87.643*** 87.738*** 87.660***
(18.421) (18.447) (18.434) (18.451) (18.424) (18.396)
Wealth 6.151* 6.298* 6.176* 6.099* 6.151* 6.166*
(3.422) (3.406) (3.405) (3.421) (3.399) (3.404)
House value -13.139** -14.154*** -13.562*** -13.590*** -13.560*** -13.627***
(5.389) (4.842) (4.707) (4.712) (4.722) (4.735)
Mortgage exp. -23.861*** -23.883*** -24.001*** -23.893*** -23.972*** -23.967***
(5.936) (5.933) (5.908) (5.966) (5.888) (5.908)
Ltv ratio -17.678*** -17.472*** -17.497*** -17.262*** -17.152*** -17.395***
(6.373) (6.464) (6.472) (6.523) (6.413) (6.426)
Age -118.346 -176.510 -119.798 -111.151 -99.651 -100.279
(94.102) (115.460) (98.037) (97.298) (90.848) (90.849)
Higher education 673.351* 721.297** 679.110* 679.182* 676.817* 669.651*
(357.506) (350.506) (361.469) (360.501) (356.093) (358.020)
N. of children -81.120 -62.203 -71.968 -75.699 -83.139 -81.434
(629.456) (627.385) (627.423) (629.813) (629.161) (628.890)
N. of child out 208.393 219.934 209.170 208.829 212.044 208.374
(217.749) (218.345) (217.867) (218.515) (217.485) (217.162)
Partner 149.896 101.097 122.499 124.951 141.399 137.969
(479.023) (479.582) (479.152) (479.110) (478.789) (478.410)
Risk aversion -4.768 -5.713 -2.818 -2.394 -4.582 -3.756













Constant 5874.363*** 5090.886*** 5891.383*** 5917.438*** 5683.262*** 6055.380***
(1466.773) (1504.802) (1483.249) (1481.625) (1519.079) (1454.668)
Log Likelihood -5961.985 -5958.186 -5961.633 -5961.612 -5962.116 -5962.309
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726 3726 3726 3726
Households 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is money put aside in the
last 12 months, including all the zero responses depicted in Figure 4. All monetary variables (income, wealth, house value
and mortgage expenditures) are given in thousands of Euros. Time averages are included for all variables except for higher
education, CBS provincial and NVM regional. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant
at the 10% level. For variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables A1 to A3 in Appendix A.
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Table 2 Money Put Aside: Interval Regression with Mundlak Terms (Homeowners)
- Unexpected Change in House Prices -
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income 95.912*** 94.765*** 95.409*** 95.544*** 95.419*** 95.540***
(20.389) (20.386) (20.401) (20.375) (20.364) (20.345)
Wealth 3.482 3.485 3.516 3.532 3.509 3.535
(3.307) (3.295) (3.293) (3.295) (3.297) (3.295)
House value -7.098 -9.955** -9.174* -9.267* -9.131* -9.190*
(5.261) (4.840) (4.743) (4.741) (4.695) (4.706)
Mortgage exp. -22.525*** -22.768*** -22.906*** -22.871*** -22.953*** -22.958***
(4.302) (4.206) (4.418) (4.452) (4.298) (4.379)
Ltv ratio -17.190*** -16.390** -16.768** -16.639** -16.800** -11.645**
(6.566) (6.668) (6.621) (6.638) (6.600) (6.628)
Age -144.313 -144.748 -141.716 -141.708 -141.917 -141.924
(106.992) (107.103) (107.050) (107.035) (107.139) (107.023)
Higher education 788.554** 806.037** 787.499** 793.367** 786.824** 790.835**
(379.066) (375.308) (380.233) (382.146) (379.300) (380.485)
N. of children 114.360 98.713 122.333 121.492 121.211 119.613
(629.971) (627.231) (627.491) (628.526) (628.471) (628.907)
N. of child out 290.802 290.135 290.687 290.102 290.529 288.403
(209.419) (210.267) (208.438) (208.824) (209.668) (209.431)
Partner 382.595 403.437 402.329 395.748 403.928 396.257
(514.433) (514.149) (515.438) (515.137) (516.147) (515.723)
Risk aversion -83.583 -75.784 -77.269 -79.211 -76.353 -77.382













Constant 5771.618*** 5311.700*** 5651.130*** 5676.843*** 5642.415*** 5680.831***
(1535.825) (1512.449) (1539.047) (1534.812) (1545.472) (1536.550)
Log Likelihood -5166.203 -5164.749 -5166.835 -5166.712 -5166.846 -5166.756
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3235 3235 3235 3235 3235 3235
Households 940 940 940 940 940 940
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is money put aside in the
last 12 months, including all the zero responses depicted in Figure 4. All monetary variables (income, wealth, house value
and mortgage expenditures) are given in thousands of Euros. Time averages are included for all variables except for higher
education, Surprise 1 and Surprise 2. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10%
level. For variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables A1 to A3 in Appendix A.
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average market price from the CBS and NVM variables to obtain Surprise 5 and 6. Similarly to
Table 1, all of the β1 estimates in Table 2 are not significantly different from zero.
A plausible explanation for the absence of an effect of the unexpected change in house prices
lies on the fact that I am employing only very short-run expectations. One could argue that,
since housing is a long-term investment, long run expectations are what matters and not just
one-year expectations. DHS provides a possible solution to this issue by asking respondents
what do they expect the yearly percentage change in house prices will be ten years ahead. Table
A2 in Appendix A shows that the sample average of this variable is positive (3.34%) and larger
than the average one-year expectation, suggesting that households expect house prices to recover
somewhat in the longer term. However, if I use long-term expectations as provided by DHS as
explanatory variable I still do not find a significant effect on money put aside by households.19
Even though I do not find a significant effect when using the whole sample of homeown-
ers, it might be that there is actually an effect for particular groups of homeowners. In fact
the model in Section 2 predicts that the effect will be stronger for older households vis-a`-vis
younger households. To test this hypothesis I generate three different age categories: less tan
35 (Age 1), between 35 and 65 (Age 2) and 65 or more (Age 3). Table 3 provides the results I
obtain when interacting the Age 2 and Age 3 dummies (Age 1 is the reference category) with
all the measures of the change in house prices in Tables 1 and 2. In this case, the estimate of
β1 captures the effect for the younger group, while the addition of β1 and the corresponding
interaction coefficient provides the estimate for the middle aged and older groups respectively.
Table 3 shows that the estimates for all three age groups are not significantly different from
zero. This result implies that not even the older homeowners display a significant reaction to
the change in house prices.
In addition to the interaction effect of age, I check as well for the conditionality on having
negative home equity and on having a National Mortgage Guarantee (NMG). Similarly to van
Table 3 Conditionality on Age
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Self-reported 1 -7.824 0.812 Self-reported 2 -25.975 0.718 Expected 1 65.442 0.466
Self-rep 1×Age2 9.012 0.994 Self-rep 2×Age2 111.263 0.112 Exp 1×Age2 -7.611 0.651
Self-rep 1×Age3 6.656 Self-rep 2×Age3 66.725 Exp 1×Age3 -48.811
Expected 2 -62.781 0.610 CBS provincial -27.281 0.746 NVM regional 40.075 0.545
Exp 2×Age2 134.004 0.450 CBS prov×Age2 79.979 0.331 NVM reg×Age2 -9.028 0.711
Exp 2×Age3 65.164 CBS prov×Age3 102.627 NVM reg×Age3 -28.865
Surprise 1 3.236 0.917 Surprise 2 -4.300 0.964 Surprise 3 -67.561 0.524
Surprise 1×Age2 -8.615 0.933 Surprise 2×Age2 57.745 0.643 Surprise 3×Age2 5.317 0.542
Surprise 1×Age3 -9.579 Surprise 2×Age3 20.571 Surprise 3×Age3 16.936
Surprise 4 14.702 0.837 Surprise 5 -153.895 0.208 Surprise 6 38.529 0.640
Surprise 4×Age2 -45.115 0.589 Surprise 5×Age2 88.632 0.352 Surprise 6×Age2 -58.887 0.214
Surprise 4×Age3 -57.491 Surprise 5×Age3 77.129 Surprise 6×Age3 -114.917
Notes: Estimates are obtained by interval regression, with the same control variables and with the same samples as in Tables
1 and 2. Coefficient estimates for control variables are available on request. p-values of interaction effects are obtained by
means of Wald tests of joint significance of the main effect and the of the interaction effects.
19For economy of space, the results are not reported here. They are available upon request.
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Table 4 Conditionality on Negative Housing Equity
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Self-reported 1 -4.043 0.765 Self-reported 2 -40.944 0.306 Expected 1 -75.110 0.148
Self-rep 1×nhe 2.779 0.953 Self-rep 2×nhe 106.986 0.066 Exp 1×nhe 157.353 0.064
Expected 2 21.852 0.697 CBS provincial 27.431 0.576 NVM regional 16.490 0.654
Exp 2×nhe 10.260 0.813 CBS prov×nhe -11.977 0.845 NVM reg×nhe 6.662 0.690
Surprise 1 6.326 0.610 Surprise 2 24.432 0.553 Surprise 3 9.375 0.855
Surprise 1×nhe -14.937 0.576 Surprise 2×nhe 17.456 0.522 Surprise 3×nhe -48.554 0.603
Surprise 4 -3.700 0.923 Surprise 5 -12.770 0.830 Surprise 6 -22.520 0.571
Surprise 4×nhe -18.455 0.770 Surprise 5×nhe -48.255 0.459 Surprise 6×nhe -8.358 0.618
Notes: Estimates are obtained by interval regression, with the same control variables and with the same samples as in Tables
1 and 2. Coefficient estimates for control variables are available on request. p-values of interaction effects are obtained by
means of Wald tests of joint significance of the main effect and the of the interaction effect.
Table 5 Conditionality on Having a National Mortgage Guarantee
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Self-reported 1 -11.261 0.398 Self-reported 2 43.864 0.300 Expected 1 32.054 0.580
Self-rep 1×nmg 13.763 0.716 Self-rep 2×nmg -33.708 0.625 Exp 1×nmg 24.787 0.753
Expected 2 10.602 0.872 CBS provincial -95.987 0.141 NVM regional 13.609 0.685
Exp 2×nmg 42.139 0.587 CBS prov×nmg 58.851 0.354 NVM reg×nmg 23.589 0.526
Surprise 1 -19.486 0.143 Surprise 2 43.160 0.348 Surprise 3 -78.146 0.146
Surprise 1×nmg 17.089 0.518 Surprise 2×nmg -44.608 0.824 Surprise 3×nmg -14.718 0.386
Surprise 4 -54.880 0.148 Surprise 5 -101.777 0.082 Surprise 6 -66.476 0.094
Surprise 4×nmg 11.364 0.437 Surprise 5×nmg 34.490 0.3573 Surprise 6×nmg 41.535 0.368
Notes: Estimates are obtained by interval regression. With the same control variables as in Tables 1 and 2 but with a sample
of only homeowners with mortgage and with a house value below 250.000 Euros. Coefficient estimates for control variables
are available on request. p-values of interaction effects are obtained by means of Wald tests of joint significance of the main
effect and the of the interaction effect.
Table 6 Symmetry of the House Price Effect
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Self-reported 1 -9.939 0.420 Self-reported 2 39.325 0.292 Expected 1 14.542 0.831
Self-rep 1×neg 27.734 0.745 Self-rep 2×neg -12.400 0.711 Exp 1×neg -23.502 0.776
Expected 2 33.791 0.672 CBS Provincial 8.322 0.235 NVM regional 88.496 0.044
Exp 2×neg -28.435 0.952 CBS Prov×neg -15.004 0.478 NVM reg×neg -90.455 0.232
Surprise 1 -16.547 0.181 Surprise 2 32.039 0.467 Surprise 3 -157.624 0.024
Surprise 1×neg 34.351 0.519 Surprise 2×neg 46.549 0.667 Surprise 3×neg 178.210 0.118
Surprise 4 20.801 0.642 Surprise 5 -87.653 0.271 Surprise 6 11.538 0.805
Surprise 4×neg -25.147 0.345 Surprise 5×neg -27.285 0.446 Surprise 6×neg -51.772 0.481
Notes: Estimates are obtained by interval regression, with the same control variables and with the same samples as in Tables
1 and 2. Coefficient estimates for control variables are available on request. p-values of interaction effects are obtained by
means of Wald tests of joint significance of the main effect and the of the interaction effect.
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Beers et al. (2015) I define households with negative home equity, popularly known as households
“under water”, as those for whom the remaining mortgage loan exceeds the market price of their
house. Households under water are financially strained and, in line with the previous literature,
I expect them to display a stronger reaction to house price shocks compared to households with
positive home equity. On the other hand, households with an NMG are entitled to receive
financial help if they have to sell their house for a price below the remaining mortgage debt. In
that way they are somewhat hedged against house price fluctuations, hence I expect them to be
more indifferent to house price changes compared to households without an NMG. Tables 4 and
5 provide the results I obtain when interacting the different measures of my main explanatory
variable with an under water dummy and an NMG dummy. The results show how the estimated
effects for all these different subgroups in the sample are not significant as the p-values are always
above or very close to 0.1.
There are several contributions in the literature (e.g. Engelhardt, 1996; Attanasio et al.,
2009; and van Beers et al., 2015) which find that households respond asymmetrically to negative
and positive changes in house prices. I perform a similar test by generating a dummy for negative
changes and interacting it with the different measures of the change in house prices. For the
present study, this experiment is almost the same as testing for a structural break around the
years 2009 and 2010. That is because for all the house price change measures I employ there
are clear turning points from positive to negative changes either in 2009 or 2010. Table 6 shows
that, in this case as well, the estimates are not significantly different from zero. This implies
that there is no asymmetry, simply because households do not react neither to positive nor to
negative changes in house prices.
Finally, Table 7 provides the results I obtain when estimating the effect of house price
changes on money put aside by renters. The specification I employ is very similar to that in
Equation (8). The only difference is the exclusion of the homeowner-specific control variables
(i.e. house value, mortgage expenditures and loan to value ratio) and the inclusion of the yearly
total expenditures in rental payments. Columns 1 and 2 show that there is no significant effect
of the CBS and NVM measures. Columns 3 and 4 show that there is no clearly significant effect
not even for those renters who declare to be saving for the purchase of a house. In addition, the
results in Table 7 show that renters have a lower propensity to save compared to homeowners,
and that those who are saving for a house are indeed saving significantly much more than the
rest of renters.
5.2 Change in LTA
The first columns in Tables 8 and 9 provide the results I obtain when using the yearly change
in long-term assets (LTA) as a dependent variable. I define LTA as the sum of saving accounts,
private pensions and employer sponsored savings plans. This measure has the problem that it
does not distinguish between active and passive saving and, additionally, it might be affected
by portfolio reshuﬄing. However, I use it for the sake of comparison with previous literature, as
it is very close to the measures employed in Engelhardt (1996), Rouwendal and Alessie (2002)
and van Beers et al. (2015). On the other hand, it has the advantage that it captures dissaving,
while my main measure of saving, i.e. money put aside, does not.
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Table 7 Money Put Aside: Interval Regression with Mundlak Terms (Renters)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income 54.071** 55.504** 46.253** 50.468**
(22.839) (22.819) (23.206) ( 23.403)
Wealth -10.775 -10.463 -12.090 -11.531
(17.080) (16.839) (17.393) (17.099)
Rent -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Age -73.626 -72.457 -92.441 -109.209
(105.998) (105.953) (110.615) (110.787)
Higher education 579.820 581.723 339.985 347.197
(495.844) (494.985) (508.852) (508.152)
N. of children -1080.043* -1064.902* -1252.744** -1227.914**
(568.611) (555.346) (623.390) (599.266)
N. of child out -84.132 -55.544 -80.844 -46.292
(188.171) (182.897) (188.690) (183.396)
Partner 1921.398 1951.697 1673.142 1835.610
(1761.933) (1788.423) (1865.559) (1884.794)
Risk aversion 16.185 19.023 31.743 36.002
(85.556) (84.966) (89.335) (88.418)
Saving for a house 3347.606*** 3181.857***
(731.511) (703.476)
CBS provincial 101.108 116.478
(177.030) (183.059)
NVM regional -100.881 -104.453
(147.417) (147.382)
CBS prov. × saving for a h. -105.184
(122.815)
NVM reg. × saving for a h. 72.437
(163.608)
Constant 877.842 155.020 -1158.798 -472.727
1238.433 1613.01 (1687.782) (1279.901)
Log Likelihood -3084.230 -3082.372 -2976.203 -2974.674
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2082 2082 2082 2082
Households 637 637 637 637
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. Dependent vari-
able is money put aside in the last 12 months, including all the zero responses depicted in Figure
4. All monetary variables, except for Rent, are given in thousands of Euros. Time averages are
included for all variables except for Higher education, CBS provincial and NVM regional. ***
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. For
variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables A1 to A3 in Appendix A.
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The first column in Table 8 shows that, when I do not consider any interaction effect, the
estimates of β1 based on the total change in house prices are all not significantly different from
zero. Only when I use the NVM regional measure of the change in house prices I find an estimate
with the expected sign and significant at the 10% level. However, this result is not robust across
different measures of the change in house prices. Compared to Table 1, the estimates in Table
8 are less precise. The standard errors are higher and the 95% confidence intervals are wider.
Therefore, it is less clear in this case whether the actual effect is close or not to zero, since there
are rather high values (in absolute terms) that fall within the 95% confidence intervals. The first
column in Table 9 shows that most of the measures of the unexpected change in house prices
yield as well insignificant estimates. Only Surprise 4 yields a slightly significant estimate, which,
once again, is not robust across the different measures I employ.
A concern related with the use of the change in LTA as a dependent variable is that the
estimates on the control variables hardly make sense. For instance, there is no significant effect
of income and the point estimates for the coefficient on the higher education dummy are nega-
tive. I find a very significant effect of the level of wealth, but this effect is clearly endogenous
since LTA are part of total wealth and therefore there is an issue of reverse causality. The fact
that there is not even a significant effect of income reveals that the dependent variable I employ
here does not capture active saving accurately. I consider as well the interaction variables age,
negative home equity, presence of NMG and sign of the house price change. However, the results
do not add any substantial information since they do not yield any clearly significant results. In
addition, I estimate the effect on the LTA of renters, which, as well, does not yield significant
results.20
5.3 Change in LTA minus Change in RMD
Both Rouwendal and Alessie (2002) and van Beers et al. (2015) argue that negative (positive)
changes in remaining mortgage debt (RMD) can be considered as saving (dissaving). Since
mortgage debt is an important component in the portfolio of Dutch homeowners, I consider
an additional measure of saving by subtracting the change in RMD from the change in LTA.
This measure accounts for the fact that households may not increase their stock of savings as a
consequence of the fall in house prices because they are deleveraging instead. If that is the case,
this phenomenon should be captured by the measure of saving I employ here. When using this
measure of savings, I include as additional explanatory variables a set of dummies indicating
the type of mortgage held by the household. In this way, I account for the fact that some type
of mortgages (e.g. interest only mortgages) do not allow for revisions of the monthly payments.
The second column of Table 8 shows that most of the measures of the change in house prices
I employ yield coefficient estimates that are not significantly different from zero. Nevertheless,
the first measure of the self-reported change in house prices yields a sizeable and slightly sig-
nificant effect. In addition, the expected change in the average market price appears to have a
statistically significant effect. This suggests that indeed households my draw down their mort-
20For economy of space, the results are not reported here. They are available upon request. The coefficient
estimates corresponding to the control variables included in the regressions reported in Tables 8 are 9 are as well
available upon request.
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Table 8 Pooled OLS with Mundlak Terms (Homeowners)
∆LTA Adjusted R2 ∆LTA-∆RMD Adjusted R2
Self-reported 1 -17.372 0.074 -289.469* 0.144
30.052 150.692
Self-reported 2 104.382 0.074 192.022 0.141
119.499 266.787
Expected 1 -227.795 0.075 453.246 0.142
148.455 344.941
Expected 2 -100.611 0.074 -765.873** 0.412
136.094 385.977
CBS provincial 9.395 0.074 1226.646 0.142
263.531 803.911
NVM regional -183.470* 0.076 79.607 0.141
103.593 249.366
Year dummies Yes - Yes -
Observations 3718 - 3494 -
Households 1028 - 979 -
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. ∆LTA stands for the change in
long-term assets, while ∆RMD stands for the change in remaining mortgage debt. The same control variables
as in Tables 1 and 2 are included in the estimation. Time averages are included for all variables except for
Higher education, CBS provincial and NVM regional. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5%
level, * significant at the 10% level. For variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables A1 to A3
in Appendix A.
Table 9 Pooled OLS with Mundlak Terms (Homeowners)
- Unexpected Change in House Prices -
∆LTA Adjusted R2 ∆LTA-∆RMD Adjusted R2
Surprise 1 -26.132 0.064 -192.736 0.153
25.449 120.501
Surprise 2 42.904 0.063 15.984 0.152
73.324 157.326
Surprise 3 -68.049 0.063 138.907 0.151
89.779 202.787
Surprise 4 -151.291* 0.064 -103.652 0.152
84.688 163.260
Surprise 5 -19.741 0.063 288.894 0.152
81.067 233.925
Surprise 6 -151.525 0.064 0.944 0.152
109.059 181.056
Year dummies Yes - Yes -
Observations 3227 - 3052 -
Households 939 - 896 -
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. ∆LTA stands for the change in
long-term assets, while ∆RMD stands for the change in remaining mortgage debt. The same control variables
as in Tables 1 and 2 are included in the estimation. Time averages are included for all variables except for
Higher education, Surprise 1 and Surprise 2. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level,
* significant at the 10% level. For variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables A1 to A3 in
Appendix A.
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gage debt when house prices decrease. However, a word of caution is pertinent since, once again,
these results are not robust to most of the measures of the change in house prices that I employ.
In addition, they are not confirmed by the analysis based on the unexpected change in house
prices, which, as shown in the second column of Table 9, yields only insignificant estimates.
Regarding the control variables, this last measure of saving yields slightly more sensible re-
sults compared to the raw change in LTA. I find again a significant, and large in magnitude,
effect of income and I find as well a slightly significant negative effect of age. I find a very
strong and significant effect of the loan to value ratio, but most likely this is due, once again,
to an issue of reverse causality since changes in RMD have a direct impact on this variable.
Once more, I estimate the effect of the change in house prices taking into account all of the
previously considered interaction effects, and, as well, I estimate the effect for renters. However,
the analyses do not yield any clearly significant results. 21
5.4 Robustness Checks
5.4.1 Long Run vs Short Run
A plausible explanation for the results I obtain is that individuals do not react to house price
changes because they expect them to increase again in the future. Therefore, only those who
are planning to sell the house in the short run are truly surprised by the recent decline in house
prices. DHS offers a possibility to check for this by asking homeowners whether they are search-
ing for a new accommodation, which could imply looking for another bought accommodation,
for a rental house or for a nursing home. Table A2 in Appendix A shows that 6% of homeowners
in the sample reply affirmatively to this question. Assuming that looking for a new location goes
together with selling the current one, this group of homeowners becomes particularly sensitive
to recent changes in house prices. To check for this I create a dummy that takes value 1 if a
homeowner is looking for a new accommodation and 0 otherwise. Interacting this dummy with
the different measures of the change in house prices yields no significant effect for this particular
group of homeowners. This implies that a change in house prices does not derive into a saving
increase not even when a household is willing to sell the house in the short run.22
5.4.2 Measurement Error
There is a branch the literature that points at the measurement error caused by the tendency of
survey respondents to round their answers up or down to a specific number (de Bresser and van
Soest, 2013). The histograms in Appendix D show a clear tendency to round towards particular
values in some of the measures of the change in house prices I use. More in particular, respon-
dents round their answers when reporting the price of their house, the change in the price of
their house in the last two years, and the expected future change in the price of their house and
the average price in the market. According to de Bresser and van Soest (2013), it is reasonable
to assume that rounding is correlated with particular characteristics of individuals such as age,
education, risk aversion and other usually unobserved attributes. Therefore, this is a case of
21For economy of space, the results are not reported here. They are available upon request.
22Results of this and all robustness checks described in this section are available upon request.
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a non-classical measurement error and it is not clear whether it implies the usual attenuation
bias.23 To address this problem, I use the CBS and NVM measures of the change in house
prices, which I assume to be uncorrelated with rounding, as instruments for Self-reported 1,
Self-reported 2, Surprise 1 and Surprise 2, and estimate β1 by means of two-stage least squares.
Even though less precise, the resulting estimates are still not significantly different from zero.
5.4.3 Lagged Effect
An additional plausible explanation for the results has to do with the timing of the effect. It
can be that homeowners do not react immediately to changes in house prices. Instead, it can be
that it takes some time before they realize that the main residence has experienced a relevant
price change. To check for this, I lag the different measures of the change in house prices for one
and two years. Lagging the total change in house prices one and two periods yields no evidence
of a significant effect. Therefore, the results of the analysis of the contemporaneous effect are
confirmed by the analysis of the lagged effect.
5.4.4 Sample Selection
Finally, note that for each set of regressions in each results table provided in this section the
same observations where used. This implies dropping a few observations when performing some
of the regressions. Generally this implies only dropping very few of them. However, in some
cases the number of observations dropped is substantial. For instance, in the sixth column of
Table 1 more than 2000 observations were dropped to equalize the number of observations across
columns. Additionally, as mentioned in Section 3, for all measures of saving (except for money
put aside) and of the change in house prices I drop the top and bottom 1% of observation in the
distribution to avoid the effect of extreme outliers. To check whether dropping observations for
both reasons has an effect on the results due to sample selection, I rerun all of the regressions
including all observations that were dropped in the main analysis. The results still show no
significant effect of house price changes on household saving.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I have studied the effect of recent changes in house prices on the saving of Dutch
homeowmers and renters. The version of the life-cycle model that I develop predicts that house-
holds will offset unexpected negative changes in house prices by increasing their stock of savings.
In addition, it predicts that the effect will be stronger the older the household is. I test these
hypotheses by employing a whole range of measures of saving and of house price changes which
I draw mainly from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS), but also from Statistics
Netherlands (CBS) and from the National Association of Real State Agents (NVM). This paper
contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I employ a new measure of saving which al-
legedly captures active saving more accurately compared to previous literature; second, I exploit
the recent sharp price drop in the Dutch housing market; and third, I apply new measures of
23In Appendix D I provide a derivation of the bias caused by the measurement error problem. The sign of the
bias will depend on the correlation between the rounding behaviour and the explanatory variables.
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the unexpected change in house prices based on subjective expectations reported by households.
By controlling for a series of demographic and economic variables, as well as for both
unobserved household effects and aggregate time effects, the panel regression results show no
clearly significant effect of any of the measures of the change in house prices on saving. This
result holds when I condition the effect on age, on having negative home equity, on having a
national mortgage guarantee (NMG) and on the sign of the house price change. This finding is
in contrast with most of the existing literature which finds an effect of house prices on either
saving or consumption. However, my results are in line with Browning et al. (2013), and par-
tially with van Beers et al. (2015) since the latter reject the life-cycle hypothesis, which predicts
that the effect will be stronger for older households.
The main conclusion I extract from my results is that Dutch households do not behave as
the life-cycle model predicts when it comes to housing, i.e. they do not view the housing asset
as a saving instrument and, accordingly, they do not offset house price decreases by increasing
saving. This implies that individuals do not internalize the investment dimension of housing,
and thus they do not consciously plan to use the house as a mean to complement their income
during retirement. Additionally, it implies that Dutch households have recently taken a con-
siderable loss in their wealth, since the decline in house prices has not been compensated by
increasing the ownership of other long-term assets. Understanding this and other facts about
how individuals plan to finance their retirement is of capital importance in the present context
of increasing fragility of pension systems in Europe.
A venue for further research is to study whether households actually do use housing equity
to finance any kind of expenditures during retirement. Even though this paper reveals they
do not plan to do it, whether they actually do it or not is as well an interesting question. A
caveat for public policy makers is that the use of housing equity as an additional source of
income during retirement should be encouraged. Especially given the current uncertainty about
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
Table A1 Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
Savings Measures
Money put aside Money in Euros put aside in the past 12 months. DHS
∆LTA Yearly change in long-term assets (saving accounts, private DHS
pension and employer sponsored saving plans) in Euros.
∆LTA - ∆RMD Yearly change in long-term assets minus yearly change in DHS
remaining mortgage debt in Euros.
House Price Change Measures
Self-reported 1 Yearly percentage change in the self-reported house price with DHS
respect to the previous year.
Self-reported 2 Reported yearly percentage change in the house price with respect DHS
to the previous year.
Expected 1 Expected percentage change in the house price for the next year DHS
with respect to the present year.
Expected 2 Expected percentage change in average house market prices for the DHS
next year with respect to the present year.
Longexp Expected yearly percentage change in average house prices in ten DHS
years.
CBS provincial Average percentage change in house market prices at the province CBS
level.
NVM regional Average percentage change in house market prices at the NVM NVM
region level.
Surprise 1 Self-reported 1 minus lagged Expected 1. DHS
Surprise 2 Self-reported 2 minus lagged Expected 1. DHS
Surprise 3 CBS provincial minus lagged Expected 1. DHS and CBS
Surprise 4 NVM regional minus lagged Expected 1. NVM and CBS
Surprise 5 CBS provincial minus lagged Expected 2. DHS and CBS
Surprise 6 NVM regional minus lagged Expected 2. NVM and CBS
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Table A1 Variable Definitions and Sources (continuation)
Variable Definition Source
Control Variables
Income Yearly total net income of the household in Euros. DHS
Weatlh Net wealth in thousands of Euros (main residence and mortgage DHS
excluded).
House value Amount in thousands of Euros the household expects to get for the DHS
first residence if it was sold.
Mortgage exp. Yearly amount in thousands of Euros of mortgage related DHS
expenditure (first residence).
Age 1; Age 2; Age 3 Dummies indicating age of the household head. Age 1: 35 or DHS
younger, Age 2: between 35 and 65, Age 3: above 65.
Higher education Dummy indicating higher education. DHS
N. of children Number of children living in the household. DHS
N. of child. out Number of children living outside of the household. DHS
Partner Dummy indicating the presence of a partner. DHS
Risk aversion Index variable indicating how much household heads agree DHS
with having save investments with guaranteed returns,
1: totally disagree, 7: totally agree.
NMG Dummy indicating the presence of a national mortgage guarantee DHS
Ltv ratio Remaining mortgage plus cash value life insurance, all divided DHS
by market price of residence. Result is multiplied by
by a hundred so as to be given in percentages. DHS
NHE Dummy indicating the presence of negative home equity. DHS
Rent Yearly amount spent in Euros in renting the main residence. DHS
Saving for a house Dummy indicating whether a renter is saving to buy a house. DHS
Looking for a house Dummy indicating whether a homeowner is looking for a new DHS
accommodation.
Notes: DHS stands for Dutch National Bank Household Survey. NVM and CBS are the Dutch acronyms for the National
Association of Real State Agents and Statistics Netherlands respectively.
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Table A2 Summary Statistics (Homeowners)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. W. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Money put aside 4686.728 3250 6597.160 4444.694 0 75000
∆LTA 765.934 0 19396.230 17209.870 -107125 107883.400
∆LTA - ∆RMD 415.542 0 47888.370 40199.790 -259564.700 285000
Income 35.861 31 14.216 6.937 12 75
Wealth 61.984 33.592 80.379 34.552 -49.447 486.662
House value 275.713 250 110.914 27.537 0 695
Mortgage expenditure 4.880 3.984 5.356 2.535 0 48.024
Ltv ratio 36.130 28.779 35.073 13.135 0 197.927
Age 1 (0-35) 0.068 - - - - -
Age 2 (35-65) 0.633 - - - - -
Age 3 (65+) 0.298 - - - - -
Higher education 0.475 - - - - -
Number of children 0.619 0 1.038 0.245 0 6
Number of child. out 1.185 1 1.396 0.488 0 8
Partner 0.795 - - - - -
Risk aversion 5.233 6 1.659 0.961 1 7
NMG 0.304 - - - - -
NHE 0.067 - - - - -
Looking for a house 0.059 - - - - -
Self-reported 1 1.238 0 12.492 10.641 -57.142 96.319
Self-reported 2 0.567 0 4.503 3.350 -10.555 22.500
Expected 1 -0.082 0 3.188 2.361 -10 15
Expected 2 -0.317 0 3.262 2.486 -12 15
Longexp 3.342 2 4.450 3.509 -40 90
CBS provincial -0.245 -1.283 4.440 3.396 -7.306 7.740
NVM regional -0.230 0.407 5.242 4.474 -19.337 12.585
Surprise 1 1.246 0 12.200 10.283 -57.142 81
Surprise 2 0.576 0 4.366 3.469 -13.555 22.500
Surprise 3 -0.231 -0.596 4.531 3.428 -14.281 14.588
Surprise 4 -0.169 0.296 5.567 4.709 -14.682 14.926
Surprise 5 -0.508 -1.055 4.396 3.395 -13.219 14.809
Surprise 6 -0.373 -0.325 5.735 4.923 -14.682 14.926
Notes: Money put aside and Income are coded in intervals. In both cases I take the midpoint of each interval to
compute summary statistics. All monetary variables (except the saving measures) are given in thousands of Euros. For
all variables the sample employed is the estimation sample in Table 1, i.e. number of observations is always 3726. W.
Std. Dev. stands for Within Standard Deviation.
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Table A3 Summary Statistics (Renters)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. W. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Money put aside 2320.845 750 4824.294 3143.431 0 75000
∆LTA 457.861 0 13599.710 11892.06 -106000 109000
Income 24.463 18000 11.423 5.097 12 75
Wealth 23.030 7.989 43.369 20.046 -50.487 374.925
Age 1 (0-35) 0.109 - - - - -
Age 2 (35-65) 0.558 - - - - -
Age 3 (65+) 0.331 - - - - -
Higher education 0.307 - - - - -
Number of children 0.268 0 0.679 0.156 0 4
Number of child. out 1.012 0 1.415 0.451 0 12
Partner 0.433 - - - - -
Risk aversion 4.902 6 2.009 1.246 1 7
Rent 536.191 453 1451.533 1248.182 0 44388
Saving for a house 0.083 - - - - -
CBS provincial -0.0721 0.468 4.564 3.307 -7.306 7.740
NVM regional 0.059 0.785 5.018 4.143 -18.404 12.585
Notes: Money put aside and Income are coded in intervals. In both cases I take the midpoint of each interval
to compute summary statistics. All monetary variables (except for the saving measures and for Rent) are given
in thousands of Euros. For all variables the sample employed is the estimation sample in Table 7, i.e. number
of observations is always 2082. With. W. Std. Dev. stands for Within Standard Deviation.
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Appendix B: Derivation of the Likelihood Function
The derivation of the likelihood function can be best explained by considering the dependent
variable in Equation (8), ∆Sit, as an underlying latent variable that is not observed. Instead, I
observe an ordinal variable int ∆Sit that takes values from zero to seven indicating each one of
the different intervals for the latent variable. Table B1 shows the exact correspondence between
the values of int ∆Sit and the intervals for ∆Sit.













where Zit is a vector with a column for each variable in the model and ξ is the corresponding
parameter vector, and taking into account the assumption that εit follows a normal distribution
with a zero average, I can write the probability that int ∆Sit = 0 conditional on Zit as
P{int ∆Sit = 0|Zit} = P{∆Sit ≤ 0|Zit}









where Φ is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to a normal, and σ =
√
V ar(εit).
Similarly, the probability that ∆Sit falls within a bounded interval, e.g. interval 1, can be
written as
P{int ∆Sit = 1|Zit} = P{0 < ∆Sit ≤ 1500|Zit}





























































where N is the total number of households observed, Ti is the number of periods a particular
household i is observed, wk is a dummy indicating whether an observation falls within the
interval k, and intuk and intlk are the upper and lower bounds of the interval k respectively.
The first summation term in the log likelihood indicates the probability that saving is zero or
negative. The second term indicates the probability that saving falls within a particular bounded
interval, while the latter term indicates the probability that saving is above 75000 Euro.
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Appendix C: Confidence Intervals
Figure C1 Confidence Intervals Results Table 1
Source: DHS; Notes: The data points, from 1 to 6, correspond with the point esti-
mates of β1 in columns 1 to 6 of Table 1. The point estimates are surrounded by the
95% confidence intervals.
Figure C2 Confidence Intervals Results Table 2
Source: DHS; Notes: The data points, from 1 to 6, correspond with the point esti-
mates of β1 in columns 1 to 6 of Table 2. The point estimates are surrounded by the
95% confidence intervals.
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Appendix D: Measurement Error
Figure D1 Self-Reported House Price
Source: DHS; Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the self-reported house price,
while the vertical axis denotes the density. Renters are excluded from the histogram.
House prices are given in thousands.
Figure D2 Self-Reported Change in House Prices
Source: DHS; Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the self-reported yearly percentage
change in the price of the own house, while the vertical axis denotes the density. For
the ease of exposition, only values between -10% and and 10 % are reported.
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Figure D3 Expected Change in the Price of the Own House
Source: DHS; Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the expected percentage change
in the price of the own house, while the vertical axis denotes the density. For the
ease of exposition, only values between -10% and and 10 % are reported.
Figure D4 Expected Change in the Average House Market Price
Source: DHS; Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the expected percentage change
in the average house market price, while the vertical axis denotes the density. For
the ease of exposition, only values between -10% and and 10 % are reported.
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Figures D1 to D4 show a clear rounding tendency towards particular values of each respective
distribution. Below I provide an example derivation of the measurement error problem this
implies. Let


























, and yi, ιi, x∗i and u∗i are
T × 1 vectors. x∗ is unobserved, instead we observe
x = x∗ + .
I assume u∗ ∼ (0,Σu) and  ∼ (0,Σ). Furthermore, I assume that Cov(u∗,x∗) = 0,
Cov(u∗, ) = 0 and Cov(x∗, ) = γ. In terms of the observations, the model can be formu-
lated as
y = ιβ1 + xβ2 + u ,
where
u = u∗ − β2.
So we have
E(u|x) = E(u∗ − β2|x∗ + ) = E(−β2|x∗)− β2,
and
Cov(u,x) = Cov(u∗ − β2,x∗ + )
= E
[
(u∗ − β2 − E (u∗ − β2)) (x∗ + − E (x∗ + ))′
]
= E [(u∗ − E(u)− β2 + E(β2))(x∗ − E(x∗) + − E())]
= Cov(u∗,x∗) + Cov(u∗, )− Cov(β2,x∗)− Cov(β2, )
= −β2(γ +Σ).
Therefore, the explanatory variable and the disturbances are correlated, which implies that the
estimate of β2 will be inconsistent. However, note that due to its non-classical nature, implied by
the correlation between x ∗ and , the measurement error does not lead to the usual attenuation
bias result. The direction of the bias will be determined by the sign of the correlation between
x ∗ and .
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Appendix E: Model (Extended Version)
E1 Introduction
In this appendix I present an extended and more detailed version of the model in Section 2 of
this paper. This appendix is structured as follows. In the next section I introduce and explain
a basic four period life-cycle model without neither income nor lifetime uncertainty. In the
third and fourth sections I study the optimal life-cycle profile of a homeowner and of a renter
respectively. In section fifth I study the effects of an unexpected decline in house prices.
E2 Life-Cycle Model Without Housing
The results I arrive to in this section are standard and are really close to the ones found in
Deaton (1992) and Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003). Nevertheless, this section is relevant since
it lays out the basis for the introduction of housing. The model with housing appears as a special
case of the basic model without housing.
Assume that the household lives for four periods, which can be roughly identified with
the different stages of the life-cycle. Furthermore, assume that there is neither lifetime nor
income uncertainty and that there are no liquidity constraints and no bequest motive. The
non-consolidated budget constraint for each period can be written as
St−1(1 + r) + Yt = Ct + St, (E.1)
where Ct and Yt are the flow of consumption and income in period t, St is the stock of savings
at the end of period t and r is the interest rate, which, for simplicity, I assume to be constant
over time.24 Furthermore, I assume the household is born without assets, there is no bequest
motive, and credit markets do not allow the household to die indebted. These assumptions
imply S0 = S4 = 0.








1− γ , (E.2)
where C1t stands for consumption at time t as planned in period one,
25 γ stands for the level of
relative risk aversion and ρ is the rate of time preference, subject to the consolidated lifetime



















24Stock variables, like savings, are considered at the end of every period. All quantities are given in real terms.
25In what follows Cτt stands for consumption in period t as planned in period τ , while Ct stands for realized
consumption in period t.
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which, combined with (E.3), gives the following closed form solutions for consumption corre-


























































































































where Ω stands for the discounted value of lifetime income evaluated at period one and the
Λs are the factors that distribute income among all the periods when consumption is planned
at period one.26 The closed form solution for each period’s savings can be found by plugging
the above expressions for consumption into the non-consolidated budget constraint (E.1), which




t−1(1 + r) + Yt − C1t ,
where S1t is the stock of savings at the end period t as planned in period one. This expression
for savings holds for periods one to three since at the end of period four the household plans to
have zero savings, i.e. S14 = 0.
E3 Life-Cycle Model With Housing: The Case of a Buyer
In this section I consider the case of a household that owns the house it occupies. To buy a house
in the Netherlands there is no downpayment required. The only requirement is that the income
level of the household is high enough to cover the regular mortgage payments. Therefore, since
there is previous income required, I consider the house is purchased at the start of the second
period, hence the household is a renter in the first period. Because there is no bequest motive,
the house is sold at the beginning of the last period. Therefore, in the last period, the household
26Note that id ρ = r consumption is the same in all periods.
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is again a renter. For simplicity, I do not consider the possibility of selling the house in periods
two and three.
I start by writing the non-consolidated budget constraint of a homeowner for each one of
the four periods. Given that the homeowner buys the house in the second period and sells it in
the fourth (in both cases at the beginning of the period), and that the mortgage schedule needs
to be satisfied, the non-consolidated budget constraints of a buyer for each one of the four are
given by
Y1 = C1 + S1 +K1,
S1(1 + r) + Y2 + (1− rM )M = C2 + S2 + α2H,
S2(1 + r) + Y3 = C3 + S3 +M(1 + r
M ),
and
S3(1 + r) + Y4 + α4H(1− φ) = C4 +K4,
respectively, where H is (constant) housing, αt is the real price of housing, φ is the transaction
cost related to selling the house, M is the borrowed amount in period two to pay for the house,
rM is the interest rate on the mortgage and Kt is the rental price. The αs are the ratio of the
price of housing over the general price level (housing excluded).
The rate of change in house prices is given by µt. If µt is equal to general inflation, the
real value of the house is constant. I assume constant general price level, hence it holds that
αt = αt−1(1 + µt). The household borrows in period two an amount M , which uses to afford
the 100 % of the house price, which is α2H. Therefore, M = α2H and both M and α2H cancel
each other out in the non-consolidated budget constraint corresponding to the second period.
This amount is repaid at the end of period three, while mortgage interests are paid both in
period two and period three. As mentioned above, the household is a renter in the first and last
periods. Therefore, in each of these periods it pays the rental price Kt = κ+ δαtH, where κ is
a constant factor and δ is the effect of the house value on the rental price. If δ = 0 the rental
price is independent of the home value. Like in the second section above, it holds again that
S0 = S4 = 0.
I assume that there is uncertainty regarding the value of µt. In turn, this implies uncertainty
regarding future house and rental prices. I assume the expected value of µt is positive and
constant, which means the household expects a constant increase in house prices over time.
Taking these assumptions into account, the consolidated budget constraint for a homeowner






















where the expectations operator appears due to the uncertainty in µt. The second term on
the left hand side of (E.5) denotes the amount the household is expecting to receive when the
house is sold at the beginning of the fourth period. The last term on the right hand side,
denotes expected future housing costs. The rental price in the first period is excluded from the
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expectation since it is already known in the planning period. Following Campbell and Cocco
(2007), I define the following utility function featuring separability between consumption and
housing












where θ denotes the preference for housing and λ represents the utility gain from owning the
occupied house. This implies λ = 0 for a renter and λ ≥ 0 for an owner. In the latter case, the
value of λ depends on the household preference for owning. Note that (E.6) is the same CRRA
type of function as (E.2) but with housing included.
Due to the separability feature, the marginal utility of consumption is not affected by hous-
ing. Therefore, choosing consumption to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
yields the same Euler equation as given by Equation (E.4). This simplifies the matter since it
allows studying changes in the value of housing solely as an income effect. Combining Equation

























where Ξ is what I call the owning factor and represents the share of lifetime income derived from
housing as evaluated in period one. The above result holds for all periods from one to four. Note
that K1 can be taken out of the expectation and that for period one realized consumption is
equal to planned consumption. The owning factor is the only change with respect to the closed
form solutions for consumption found in the case without housing. Any change in the owning
factor that is known in the planning period will be distributed among the four periods according
to the Λt factors.
Once again, the solution for savings can be found by using the non-consolidated budget
constraint for every period. For each period, planned savings is thus be given by
S1 = Y1 − C1 −K1,
S12 = S1(1 + r) + Y2 − C12 − E1MrM ,
S13 = S
1
2(1 + r) + Y3 − C13 − E1M(1 + rM ),
and S14 = 0. It becomes clear now that unexpected changes in the value of housing will have
an effect on consumption and saving behaviour. I leave the analysis of the consequences of a
change in the value of housing for the fifth section of this appendix.
E4 Life-Cycle Model With Housing: The Case of a Renter
In this section I consider the case of a household that rents the house it occupies. Just like in
the case of an owner, I start by writing the non-consolidated budget constraints for each period,
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which, in generic form, are given by
St−1(1 + r) + Yt = Ct + St +Kt,
where once more we have S0 = S4 = 0 and Kt = κ+ δαtH. The consolidated budget constraint








Employing the same CRRA utility function as the one given in Equation (E.6) and setting
λ = 0, I arrive again to the Euler equation as given by Equation (E.4). Combining the Euler
equation and the consolidated budget constraint given by (E.7), I find the closed form solutions















where Ψ is what I call the renting factor which includes lifetime rental payments as evaluated in
period one. Note that K1 can be taken out of the expectation and that in period one planned
consumption is equal to realized consumption. Just like in the case of the owning factor, any
change in the renting factor that is known in the planning period will be distributed among the
four periods according to the Λt factors. Again the solution for savings can be found by using
the non-consolidated budget constraint for every period, which yields
S1t = S
1
t−1(1 + r) + Yt − C1t −Kt
for periods one to three. Again S14 = 0 due to the lack of a bequest motive.
E5 The Effect of Housing Price Declines on Consumption and Savings
If the expectation about the rate of change in house prices, µt, is satisfied in every period,
realized consumption and savings are equal to the plan set in period one, and the house is sold
in period four at the expected price. In this section, I consider an unexpected shift in µt, from
positive to negative. This implies a negative surprise for the household, since the household
expects µt to be positive and constant over time. The surprise does not affect the expected
value of µt. Therefore, the household expects that the rate of change in house prices will come
back to its previous level the next period and stay constant from then onwards. The information
about the actual value of µt becomes available at the beginning of each period.
I study the reaction in terms of consumption and savings when the drop in µt takes place
in either the second, third or fourth period. Therefore I consider three different scenarios for
a particular household. It is clear that if the change takes place in the first period the new
information will be automatically incorporated in the decision determining the optimal plan.
However, if the unexpected change in µt takes place between the second and fourth period, the
household will replan consumption and savings of that period and of those that are still to come.
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Therefore, realized consumption will differ from the plan set in period one. In what follows I
show how an unexpected change in αt implied by a negative µt has a contemporaneous effect
on savings and consumption, the size of which is contingent on the stage of the life-cycle.
I start by focusing on the case of the buyer. If the change takes place in the second period,
i.e. µ2 < 0 , I assume that it happens right after the home purchase, which implies that the
mortgage payment will not be affected by the drop in house prices .27 Therefore, reoptimization







































Note that E2α4 = α1(1 + µ2)E2(1 + µ3)(1 + µ4) < E1α4 = E1α1(1 + µ2)(1 + µ3)(1 + µ4), since
the realized value of µ2 is lower than was expected in period one. Therefore, the household is
negatively surprised and now expects to sell the house in the last period for a lower price than
it was expected in period one. Since the decline in house prices is not taken into account in the
price paid for the newly acquired house, the mortgage payments remain the same. Combining
the Euler equation resulting from the maximization problem with the budget constraint in (E.8)









































































Note that that all mortgage payments are already known in the second period since M = α2H
and thus they can be taken out of the expectation. In addition, for the second period planned
consumption is equal to realized consumption.
Assuming that the loss implied by the decrease in the expected value of housing is larger
27This assumption is grounded on the fact that in this section I want to study the effect of house price declines
for the case of homeowners, and not soon-to-be homeowners.
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than the benefit implied by the expected decrease in the fourth period rental price, the period
two decline in house prices reduces lifetime income and thus implies, ceteris paribus, a reduction
in consumption. However, the decline in consumption is smoothed over periods two, three and
four. Note that the effect on consumption would be ambiguous if mortgage payments were
allowed to change as well.
To study the contemporaneous effect of the house price decline, I define realized consumption




where η2 is the forecast error denoting the difference between realized and planned consumption
in period two. The forecast error appears directly as a consequence of the unexpected change
in house prices. Since I am considering a decline in house prices, the forecast error is negative,
which means that realized consumption is smaller than planned consumption.
If the household is in the third stage of the life-cycle when the change in µt takes place,





















The surprise in µ3 represents now exactly the same change in lifetime income as when the
surprise was considered in the second period of the life-cycle.28 That is the case because of
three reasons: first, I am always considering the same size for the unexpected change in µt;
second, Etµt is constant and positive over time and, third, in the periods previous to a house
price decline I assume the expectations about µt were satisfied. These assumptions provide the
advantage of allowing the evaluation of exactly the same drop in lifetime income, but at different
stages of the life-cycle.







































28That means E2α4 takes the same value irrespective of whether the decline in house prices takes place in the
second or third periods. Therefore, the household expects to sell the house for the same diminished value no
matter when the decline in the price takes place.
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Note that M(1 + rM ) could be taken out of the expectation and for period three planned
consumption equals realized consumption. The household has now only two periods to smooth
the shock implied by the drop in lifetime income. Therefore, the contemporaneous negative
effect on consumption for a household in the third stage of the life-cycle is greater than for a
household that is on the second stage of the life-cycle. Once again the contemporaneous effect
of the decline in house prices can be depicted by writing realized consumption as a function of




If the household is in the fourth stage of the life-cycle when the change in µt takes place,
reoptimization will imply choosing only C4 to maximize utility subject to the updated budget
constraint
Y4 + α4H(1− φ) = C4 +K4,
which directly yields
C4 = Y4 + α4H(1− φ)−K4 = Y4 + Ξ4,
where there are no expectations and planned consumption is equal to realized consumption.
Now the full shock to lifetime income is absorbed by a reduction in consumption in period
four. Therefore, the contemporaneous shock to consumption is the greatest when the household
is at the last stage of the life-cycle. This result make sense, since the longer is the planning
horizon when the shock occurs the more periods there are to absorb it and the smallest is the
contemporaneous effect on consumption. Once again, the contemporaneous effect of the decline




To find the effect on savings, I use the expressions that derive from the unconsolidated budget
constraints, which are given in the third section of this appendix. As it is shown there, for a
given level of income and mortgage payments, savings will change by the same amount but in
the opposite direction as consumption. By the same result given for consumption, the savings
increase will be higher the later in life the shock occurs, with the exception of the fourth period,
for which it still holds that S4 = 0 due to the absence of a bequest motive. Just like I have done
for consumption, the contemporaneous effect of a house price decline on savings can be studied
by expressing realized savings as planned savings plus a forecast error. The contemporaneous
effect on savings of a change in house prices in period two and three is then given by
S2 = S1(1 + r) + Y2 − C12 −MrM − η2
and
S3 = S2(1 + r) + Y3 − C13 −M(1 + rM )− η3
respectively. Note that plugging in a negative surprise in lifetime income implied by a decline
in house prices, i.e. η2 < 0 and η3 < 0 respectively, will imply an increase in realized savings
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above what was planned in period one.
Regarding the effect of the above considered housing shock for a household who rents the
place it occupies, it can be easily seen that it will imply a decline on the rental price. That is
because I have considered the rental price as a function of the value of the house. Therefore, a
decline in the real vaule of the house implies a decline in the rental price as long as δ > 0. This
decline would imply an increase in lifetime income and thus an increase in consumption and a
decrease in savings. However, this does not seem very realistic, especially for the Dutch case,
where the rental market is highly regulated and, according to CBS, almost 50% of rental homes
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